





exclude residents from taking advantage of its benefits.  Conversely, “firms” which benefit from a 
given regime may be explicitly or implicitly prohibited from operating in the domestic market.20  
Both of these provisions would ensure the off-shore center that criminal organizations that aim at 
benefiting from the regime do not “reside” in the off-shore center. 
A similar goal is served by multi-tiered licensing systems.  Under such a system, an off-
shore center offers two rather different licenses to financial intermediaries, a “restricted” and an 
“unrestricted” license.  A typical multi-tiered regime states that restricted licensees may not engage 
in transactions with residents inside the off-shore center.  They may not collect deposits or even 
make certain investments.  Similar restrictions may also apply to the ability of restricted licensees to 
solicit funds from the general public. 
The raison d’être of rules of the type described above is easily perceived.  They aim at 
generating externalities, or more precisely, at avoiding the internalization of costs associated with 
money laundering. 
 
4.  INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REGULATION AND OFF-SHORE CENTRES 
            In the above paragraph we stressed that the meeting between the demand for 
money laundering expressed by organized crime and the supply of laundering services offered by an 
offshore country makes the objective function of the latter quite special. 
 
The specific nature of this objective function must be considered when analyzing how 
best to design international regulations against money laundering, which is none other than the 
endogenous final result of strategic interaction between the club of the "virtuous" countries—
virtuous in the sense of sensitivity or propensity to combat laundering—and the individual offshore 
countries. We shall analyze this problem area by using simple game theory formulations. 
 
Let us assume initially that the game structure involves two players: the club of virtuous 
countries (A) and a generic country inclined to launder money (B). The analysis leads us to 
establish under which conditions the first player can ensure the collaboration of the second.  
 
In this initial formulation, we use the simplest possible structure, a matrix 
representation. Let us bear in mind that this formulation implies a game in which the players enjoy 
perfect information, i.e. each is aware of the actions of the other. 
 
The club can choose between two moves: “seek collaboration” (SC) or “not seek 
collaboration” (NSC). In the first case, it promises the laundering-inclined country recompense 
equal to T if the country undertakes to refrain from conduct damaging to the members of the club. 
If, on the other hand, it chooses the move “not seek collaboration” (NSC), it promises nothing and 
passively endures the actions of the laundering country. 
 
Country (B), for its part, can choose between “favor laundering” (F) and “not favor 
laundering” (NF). In the first case it obtains a benefit equal to R, while in the second it must sustain 
costs and its payoff is equal to –C. In the case of NF, however, it can hope, if A has chosen SC, to 
obtain a subsidy of T.  
 
The conduct of B generates the following consequences for A: if B conducts itself 
virtuously, A enjoys a greater level of integrity in the international financial system, and therefore 
obtains a payoff equal to I. In the opposite case, this integrity declines and A receives NI. 
                                                                 
20 The example of “ring fencing” in the text is derived from OECD, (1998) at 27. 
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Now, for B “F” is a winning strategy (i.e. better whatever A's decision is), unless  
 




T > R + C      À 
 
i.e. the amount of the transfer must cover both the costs sustained and the benefits lost 
through non-cooperative conduct.  
 
If this constraint is not satisfied, the only possible equilibrium is (NSC, F), because the 
cooperative solution is never profitable for B. 
 
In addition to this constraint, the transfer must also satisfy the following: 
 




T < I – NI     Á 
 
the transfer must be less costly than the benefits derived from it. The club, in fact, 
absorbs the transfer costs only if this does not place it in a worse situation than the case where B 
chooses “F”. If this were not the case, “NSC” would become the winning strategy, nipping the 
possibility of cooperation in the bud. 
 
Conditions À and Á are sufficient for the creation of an alternative equilibrium equal to 
(SC, NF). We ask ourselves, however, whether they should also be regarded as realistic.  We noted 
earlier that the benefits country B enjoys by maintaining non-virtuous conduct are likely to be 
inferior to the benefits A would obtain from B’s collaboration. This conclusion is sustained by the 
fact that the evaluation must assign different weights to the two factors (often the relative 
dimensions of the two contracting parties in question are different). In spite of this consideration, 
condition À seems fairly costly, so that the conduct of B must be completely “repaid” by A. Let us 
now see how the situation can be modified by requiring that the transfer T function as a simple 
incentive.  
 
We assume that A, by choosing “SC”, not only promises incentives but can also 
threaten to inflict a certain damage on B if its conduct is not virtuous. Let us further assume that this 
sanction, amounting to S, entails no cost for A (an embargo, for example, restrictions on trade 
relations, etc.: for the single country affected this damage is often considerable, while for the other 
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countries the losses are generally limited or nil).  
 








I – T ;  
T – C 




I ; – C NI ; R  
 
 
the payoff of B in the case (F; SC) is diminished, and “F” is no longer the winning 
strategy in any case. In fact, for  
 




S > C + R 
 
collaboration becomes the winning strategy for B. We doubt, however, that this system 
can be used exclusively. Such measures, for one thing, would be extremely harsh and unacceptable 
in political-diplomatic terms.  If the punitive approach is combined with incentives, however, the 
new effectiveness constraint for transfer T is: 
 
R - S <T – C 
 
that is  
 
T > R + C – S 
 
which suggests an incentive too costly for A: in fact, it must exceed the cost of the 
cooperative conduct of B and the earnings lost because is desists from favoring laundering, but it 
corrects this amount for the presence of a threat. The approach that links the sanction with an 
incentive is not only more efficient but is only costly to a point. 
 
The result therefore demonstrates that cooperation is possible only if suitably modeled 
incentive systems are employed, responding both to the needs of the club and the needs and 
peculiarities of the offshore countries inclined toward money laundering. An active approach is 
certainly a necessary condition for achieving the result, as a watch-and-wait attitude or a mere 
appeal to B’s sense of morality would possibly fail. 
 
On the other hand, the validity of the assumption clashes with the harshness of a reality 
that is much less schematic, characterized particularly by information asymmetries and non-
simultaneity of moves.  
 
The second approach we are proposing is a simple sequential game in which a third 
player, Nature, is present. Let us recall that in game theory Nature is a player characterized by an 
aleatory strategy: its moves are generated randomly according to an aleatory variable with known 
parameters. It represents the imponderable element, predictable only as an average, which can 
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condition how the player plays the game.  
 
The sequential nature of the game and the aleatory element permit us to investigate the 
real possibility of obtaining the preceding results even when information is asymmetrical. 
 
The first player to move is the club, which proposes to country B to collaborate in the 
war against money laundering. Country B has two possibilities: it can refuse or accept. If it refuses, 
it suffer a sanction equal to S but produces no effort to control laundering. If it accepts, it must 
make an effort but can choose between two levels of effort: high or low. In exchange, it receives a 
transfer equal to T. Let us say, therefore, that the level of effort expended by B (computing both the 
additional costs sustained and the benefits lost through virtuous conduct) can be equal to: 
· zero, in the case where it rejects the proposal and does not collaborate; 
· El , in the case where it chooses a low level of effort; 
· Eh , in the case where it chooses a high level of effort. 
 
The club, however, has no way to precisely verify whether B, after accepting the 
proposal of collaboration, is actually making an effort. Admission to the benefits of the club will 
therefore be subject to results of specific audits on the effort expended, whose outcome is aleatory 
and not totally controllable by either of the two players. This is where Nature comes into play, 
generating two possible outcomes for the audits: 
· a low level of effort by country B with probability p; 
· an adequate level of effort by country B with probability 1–p. 
 
In the first case, the transfer is revoked, but expulsion from the club permits B to choose 
a zero level of effort. In the second case, the transfer is confirmed but country B must commit itself 
in accordance with the level chosen. Let us also admit that the probability of an inadequate level of 
effort being detected is inversely related to the effort expended: 
 
p = p(E i)   with i=a,b 
 
p(Eh) < p(El) 
 
Hereinafter, we shall assume that  
 
p(Ei) = 1 – Ei  
 
For country B the possible results are: 
· – S (if its refuses to collaborate or if an insufficient level of effort is 
discovered); 
· T – El (if it chooses a low level of effort and passes the audits); 
· T – Eh (if it chooses a high level of effort and passes the audits). 
 
Let us also admit the simplest possible utility function; in the three cases listed above, 
respectively, 
 
                  –S 
VB = T – El     
               T – Eh 
 
The assumption of first-degree homogeneity, apparently innocuous, except for the 
degree of realism, generates significant implications regarding aversion to risk (found to be nil; B is 
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risk-neutral). The club assesses the level of effort with a function UA; UA’>0, and 
 
UA(Eh) > UA(El) > UA(0) 
 
For A three results are possible: 
· UA(0) if B refuses or if an insufficient level of effort is detected; 
· UA(El) – T if B passes the audits and chooses a low level of effort; 
· UA(Eh) – T if B passes the audits and chooses a high level of effort. 
 
For greater clarity, let us summarize the results in the tree diagram shown in the 
following figure (the pairs of payoff show first those of A then those of B). 
 
Let us now seek to understand what characteristics the promised transfers and the 
threatened sanctions should have to induce B to accept the cooperative solution and the higher level 
of effort. 
 
First of all, B must be convinced to choose the lower portion of the tree, i.e. it must 
agree to collaborate. Being risk-neutral, it maximizes the expected value of its payoff (in risk-
neutral individuals, maximization of the expected value maximizes the expected utility). We shall 
therefore ask:  
 
 
                  offers collaboration                      refuses 
Club A ·                                       Country B ·                        · UA(0),  – S 
                                                          · 




                                     country B (not observable by A) 
                                                          · 
                           high                                                low                  
                           effort                                                 effort 
 
 
      Nature: passes the audits?                              Nature: passes the audits?                         
                       ·                                                              · 
    
             no                  yes                                                   no                yes                     
 
          ·                        ·                                      ·                      · 







that the expected value in case of sanctions be lower than the expected value in the 
situation of collaboration: 
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T – Ei >– S Â    (condition of participation) 
 
the extent of the sanction must produce a situation of utility lower than that in which B 
selects virtuous conduct and passes the audits. We can also note that the expression can be 
transformed into: 
 
T – (– S) > Ei 
 
Reflected again in other terms, the expression tells us that for the agent the monetary 
difference between the incentive and the sanction must exceed the cost of the effort. 
 
Once collaboration is assured, the system of incentives and sanctions must also ensure a 
high level of effort. For this we shall ask that the expected utility for a conduct that chooses El be 
lower than that for Ea . Recalling again that in our case utility and expected value are equal, we 
require that the following inequality occur 
 
– S ·  p(El) + (T – El) ·  [1 – p(El)] < (– S) ·  p(Eh) + (T – Eh) ·  [1 – p(Eh)] 
 
which can be rearranged to obtain the condition  
 
(T + S) [p(El) – p(Eh)] > Ea [1 – p(Eh)] – El [1 – p(El)]              Ã  
                                                                      (condition of efficiency) 
 
The left-hand member contains two factors: the first must be read, as we previously did, 
as  
 
T – (–S) 
 
i.e. the difference, in monetary terms, that is generated by passing from the condition in 
which B is excluded from the benefits and is subject to sanctions to the condition in which it obtains 
admission to the club.  
 
This change is corrected by the second factor, which indicates the difference in 
probability of exclusion in the case where B selects a low level of effort versus the case where it 
selects a high level of effort. 
 
The second member contains the difference of effort expected from the case in which 
the choice is high effort versus the case of low effort. This difference is expected, since the two 
levels of effort are corrected for the probability that this effort is actually required: and this does not 
occur in any case, but only with a probability equivalent to 1–E i . 
 
Thus condition Ã requires that the change in expected effort, for one following a 
virtuous conduct, be more than exceeded by the expected change in the recompense (intended as 
both greater transfers and lesser sanctions). In other words, the virtuous country must perceive that, 
beyond the veil of information asymmetries, its conduct generates tangible effects on the value of 
its payoff.  
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The structure of the incentives and the sanctions must reflect as nearly as possible the 
actions of the agent, who may notice a correlation between the incentives and his conduct. 
 
Club A is not informed of B's choices regarding the level of effort. The offer of 
collaboration must therefore consider the possibility that B will select El. The amount of the transfer 
must be limited to prevent A from finding itself in a worse situation, in the case of collaboration 
with little effort, than it would have been in if B had not accepted: 
 
UA(0) ·  p + [UA(El) – T] ·  (1 – p) > UA(0) 
 
hence we find: 
 
T < UA(El)  – UA(0)           Ä     (condition of credibility) 
 
the transfer cannot exceed the increase in utility obtained from the situation of zero 
effort to that of low effort. 
 
On the other hand, if the transfer satisfies condition Ä, the application of the sanction is 
no longer credible: it damages B but absolves it from any effort to collaborate, erasing the utility of 
A from UA(El)  – T to UA(0), a change that Ä shows to be negative.  
 
The threat is no longer credible because, if the opportunity presents itself, A has no real 
intention of applying it. In the more precise terms of game theory, the application of the sanction is 
not a subgame equilibrium given the occurrence of an outcome of the audits that reveals insufficient 
effort. 
 
Country B is aware of the structure of the game and therefore the payoff. Knowing that 
the sanction is not credible, i.e. will never be applied, it can now decide between the two (non-
aleatory!) alternatives (T – El) and (T – Eh) and clearly opts for the former.  
 
At this point, Club A is assured the cooperation of B but has no hope of obtaining 
greater effort from it. The solution to these problems of fragility in the cooperative equilibrium, in 
game theory, usually lies—as stressed earlier—in two alternative directions: 
 
· the possibility of “tying its own hands”: the club finds a system for 
constraining itself at the start of the game to the declared strategy of the adversary. In the 
relationships between individuals or companies, they usually resort to signing binding 
contracts. In our context, we might think of some form of treaty or recourse to a central 
authority, empowered to manage the club, shielded from the influences of the member states 
(and thus their temptation to deviate from the established strategy). But is the club willing to 
have its hands tied and, consequently, to accept the risks associated with the random nature 
of the audits? 
games repeated: let us imagine that the game is repeated more than once (or infinite 
times) and that the sanction is applied only for the duration of one of the individual games. This 
application, through less than preferable in the first game, makes the threat credible for the 
subsequent repetitions and the damage generated by the first application is then recovered by the 
greater well-being it provides in future periods. B, in fact, is burned by the experience. 
 
 
  
